Geopolitical Axes & Mega-Corridors: Global Power Rivalries & the Strategic Greece–Israel Partnership in the Eastern Mediterranean

The view that Greece is harmed by its strategic cooperation with Israel is
geopolitically unfounded; whereas, the only actor who benefits from promoting
this narrative is Turkey.
In the broad picture, the international system is undergoing a phase of
restructuring, driven by the doctrine of “Peace through Strength.” Geopolitical
changes are unfolding rapidly and persistently, either through the exercise of
military, energy, and economic pressure or through the threat thereof – but in
every case, through strength.
This is a difficult process of revising alliances, reassessing institutions, and
shaping new axes of strategic convergence and cooperation.
But what is the cause, and what is at stake?
The cause is the global redistribution of power through the redrawing of spheres
of influence. What is at stake is control over energy resources and routes,
global wealth-producing resources, rare earths, commercial, economic, and
digital corridors. Through control of these, global hegemony is secured – or at
the very least, the rise of competing powers is contained.
Within this framework, in September 2023, following the Abraham Accords, the
G7 announced in India the implementation of the India – Middle East – Europe
Corridor (IMEC), a mega-corridor for trade, energy, economics, and digital
connectivity. This corridor will connect India with the United Arab Emirates,
Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Israel, Cyprus, and Greece, ultimately reaching Europe.
Two key conclusions emerge from the design of IMEC. First, it serves the US
strategy of containing China by strengthening India’s role and operating
competitively against China’s Belt & Road Initiative (BRI). Second, it bypasses,
among others, Turkey, thereby diminishing its geopolitical value.
The announcement of the US-designed IMEC triggered violent conflicts,
intense geopolitical processes, and major strategic realignment in the Middle
East, with Israel at the center. Through these developments, the axes of
opposing strategic interests and the real objective have already emerged: the
routing and control of interregional corridors as spheres of influence.
Within this context, Turkey’s strategic choice is to promote corridors that serve
as alternatives to US and EU plans, aligning more closely with China’s strategy.
At the same time, Turkey seeks to strengthen its own position as an energy and
trade hub, as well as a security provider for Europe, in fact, promoting Europe’s
dependence on Turkey.
However, within the framework of their long-term strategy, the United States is
promoting – through both the Abraham Accords and initiatives such as “3+1”
and the East Med Gateway Act – a strong axis of cooperation among Greece,

Cyprus, and Israel, thereby upgrading the geopolitical importance of the wider
Eastern Mediterranean.
Under these conditions, the strategic cooperation among Greece, Israel (and
Cyprus) is neither opportunistic nor asymmetrical. It is structural. It forms part
of a broader architecture of security and connectivity, as part of the
implementation of IMEC, while functioning as a strength multiplier, empowering
deterrence and adding substantial geopolitical value on multiple levels.
In reality, the Greece – Israel strategic relationship does not serve only bilateral
interests. It is systemic within a broader network of partnerships designed under
US strategic planning, involving India and key Arab states such as the United
Arab Emirates, as a counterweight to Chinese influence.
From this perspective, the Greece – Israel strategic partnership strengthens
Greece’s leverage in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Balkans, NATO, and the
EU, while simultaneously providing Israel with vital strategic depth and valuable
diplomatic capital. At the same time, it significantly reduces Turkey’s relative
geopolitical importance.
However, this is no longer merely a Greece – Turkey or even Israel – Turkey
power rivalry. It has become part of a broader interregional confrontation
between competing geopolitical axes and spheres of influence on a much larger
scale: on one side, the US-designed IMEC, and on the other, the routes
associated with China’s BRI.
Overall, Greek – Israeli cooperation continues to strengthen its foundations and
carries long-term strategic significance. IMEC acts as an accelerator of its
historic deepening, as well as a catalyst for broader geopolitical developments.
In conclusion, questioning this strategic convergence is not simply mistaken; it
runs counter to the national interests of both Greece and Israel, and
undermines a broader strategic framework involving key allies and partners
such as the United States, the EU, India, Cyprus, and the United Arab Emirates.